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BETWEEN UTOPIA AND DYSTOPIA: 
THE LABILITIES OF NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE 
Nicolae Harsanyi and Michael D. Kennedy 
UTOPIA, DYSTOPIA AND LABILITY 
Utopia has been used to refer to an idea, a thing to dream about, a transcendent vision 
designed to replace an unsatisfactory present.l Most often, these visions have as  their object of 
transcendence whole societies, whose core is fundamentally flawed, and which should be replaced 
through the utopian operation.2 Utopia is therefore a form of criticism containing a hope of 
practical change. 
Dystopia can only exist with utopia: dystopia is the claimed utopia gone wrong. It  is 
designed to make the normative present3 seem a better alternative to what utopia promises. By 
sanctioning this present state of affairs, dystopia sparks the powers of negative imagination, much 
as  utopia sparks more generous possibilities in human imagination. 
Utopia and dystopia connote a state of proteic lability. They appear to be unstable in 
relation to each other, as  one tends to fold into the other. They constantly generate their 
opposites, harboring a dialectical relationship to each other, yet yielding no synthesis. Dystopic 
visions can only emerge out of the critique of utopic ones, but dystopic visions also romanticize the 
present, giving the present moment an eutopic, or normatively desireable, quality.4 Dystopia is 
therefore seen also as  "abnormal," making normality not only extent, but also good. 
1 Especially as  it was used in in the discourse of the Institute for the Humanities in the Fall of 
1992, in the midst of which this paper was written. 
2 Of course there are many utopian communities the size of villages or small towns, from the 
Kibbutz to the Shakers, but we do not mean to refer to such experiments in the reconstruction of 
life a t  a face to face level. Our comments are mostly directed a t  the "societal" level of nations and 
their states, much as  the most consequential visions of nationalism, liberalism and socialism were 
directed in this century. 
3 We say normative present to distinguish actual conditions from the "normality" that ought to 
exist were the utopian project not engaged. This distinction is important to introduce to take into 
account those writers (e.g. Eugene Zamyatin and George Orwell) criticizing the dystopian present 
in communist-led societies on the basis of an imagined "normal" present, embryonic in the 
liberation of societies from their dystopian oppressors. 
Our paper is an exploration of the labile relationship among utopia, dystopia and eutopia, 
within a specific regional context where the lability of alternative visions is most developed. 
The fluid history of Eastern Europe makes the region the perfect site to consider the 
lability of these utopias. The "sick heart of Europe" was the term Hugh seton-watson5 used to 
describe this region, not without cause. If we can say that a sick heart comes from an uncertainty 
as  to how to think about oneself, or within what vision to project oneself, then Eastern Europe's 
heart is truly sick, and it is sick with confusion. For nowhere else in the world has the lability 
among visions associated with communism, nationalism and liberalism been more prominent. 
EASTERN EUROPE 
When one speaks of this lability in Eastern Europe today, the countries that leap to mind 
are the former Yugoslavia, the soon-to-be former Czechoslovakia and the new Germany. In each 
of these cases, the lability of the utopias within a discourse of nationalism, communism and 
liberalism is prominent, but in different forms from what we consider today. 
Our presentation is not inspired by these cases, for if it were, the pains associated with the 
reconfiguration of national boundaries, whether through violent or peaceful means, would have to 
loom large in our accounts. Our focus is more on the reconstitution of societal identities without 
the making of new boundaries among nations and their states. 
Our analysis is informed by a comparison of nationalism, communism and liberalism in 
Ukraine, Poland, Hungary and Romania. Their various historical trajectories and post-communist 
conditions allow us to adopt a novel vantage point from which we might understand the lability of 
utopic visions that have so dominated the history of Eastern Europe. Their comparison allows us 
to see the variability within national visions so easily homogenized with reference to the opposition 
4 Thomas More, who used the term "utopia" for the first time, played on the two Greek words: 
good place (eu-topos) and no place (ou-topos). When eutopia has been used in subsequent literary 
scholarship, its deployment signifies the existence of a good place, rather than its impossibilty, as 
ou-topos suggests. 
5 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Sick Heart of Europe: The Problem of the Danubian Lands, University 
of Washington Press, 1975. 
between nationalism and liberalism.6 Our intent is not to give you the systematic comparison 
among these countries that we are elaborating for other uses.7 Rather, we shall suggest a couple 
of ways in which we can think about the lability of utopias by drawing upon the relationships 
between these visions in our four cases. 
Before we turn to illustrations of our thesis, we should consider the different reasons why 
we think this lability in topias exists. 
WHY IS THERE LABILITY? 
The same quality of human mind can make up utopia or dystopia. Both are figments of 
imagination engendered by a critical attitude. The criteria of their criticisms are not based on 
objective conditions, as  much as  in subjective factors. The importance of subjectivity in making 
utopia thus means that clear cut distinctions are hard to draw. What f i r  some is a utopia, for 
others may be dystopia, and vice versa. 
Because utopia is so subjective, it can easily be transformed into a dystopic vision, much 
a s  any fiction can be modified by another author. But utopia itself has something more to it, for 
its fictional state, though gratifying, is not satisfactory. I t  demands fulfillment by its translation 
6 In a footnote, one can only suggest the richness of the comparisons. One might distinguish the 
social groups which historically "embody" the nation, by comparing the "aristocratic" nationalisms 
of Poland and Hungary to the "peasant" nationalisms of Ukraine and Romania. Ukraine and 
Romania each had well developed integral nationalisms between the world wars, while Poland and 
Hungary's integral nationalisms were always compartively limited by the aristocratic lineages 
national ideologues would draw. While one can draw similarities along these dimensions, the 
similarities inspired by the interaction of contending nationalisms, between Poland and Ukraine, 
on the one hand, and between Romania and Hungary, for example, on the other, can be drawn. 
Hungarian irredentist claims on Transylvania, while diminished after World War 11, nevertheless 
continue to inspire Romanian nationalism on its main course. Ukrainian nationalism has always 
had both Russian and Polish visions to contest, if in different ways. The struggle to claim national 
status was inspired by both Russians and Poles insisting that Ukrainians were not a really 
separate nation. 
7 We have taught a course in the fall of 1992 which tries to develop this systematic comparison, 
and we hope to use it as  a basis for a more sustained analysis of these nations' different 
trajectories. 
into "reality". However as soon as the utopia is transformed into reality, it must begin to lose 
that innocence conferred to it by its past imaginary existence. 
Any vision is always based on an incomplete account of reality. Since reality is made up 
of an infinite set of qualities, any intervention is likely to generate a set of responses that the 
author could hardly anticipate, and could hardly include in the original vision. Utopias 
transformed into practical programs for reorganizing societies thus inevitably descend from the 
original hopes of dreamers. They step out of the realm of the ideal, although different visions of 
utopia carry different implicit tides of lability. It matters what the original dream looked like. 
Even when Adam and Eve were cast out of Eden, that which they lost informed the character of 
their discontent. 
REAL EXISTING SOCIALISM 
The changes of 1989-91 in Eastern Europe have led many commentators8 to argue that 
the appeal of utopian thinking, and especially its experiments, has been been destroyed. 
Communist rule itself first helped to erase from both East European and world imaginations the 
variety of socialisms that once existed in Eastern Europe generally.9 As communism helped to 
erase alternative socialisms, the dystopia of real existing socialism helped to destroy the appeal of 
utopia itself. Actual socialism created only the eutopia of "normality," in a typically labile way. 
For the apparatchiks, actual socialism became a normality providing relative privilege, but 
deprived of any utopian pretension. For the common folk, the good life associated with normality 
lay outside their dystopic world of everyday life. 
8 Jonathan Beecher, for example, used this to introduce his colloquium to the Institute for the 
Humanities: "Two Concepts of Utopia," September 11, 1992. 
9 The variety of socialisms changes by place, of course. In our set, Romania had the least 
developed socialist tradition, and while Hungary had more alternative socialisms, Ukrainians and 
Poles seemed to generate the greatest variety, the internationalist communist form being 
generally the least domestically popular. Consider, for instance, the stateless socialism of an 
Abramowski, and the patriotic socialisms of a Brzozowski or Drahomanov and Franko. 
This latter eutopia of normality depended upon the recognition of the dystopia of real 
existing socialism. Although the person on the street would see this dystopia in the totality of 
control, the dystopia of Romanian socialism can be explained in a more analytical fashion: lo 
The Romanian public sphere was appropriated by the partylstate. The partylstate controlled the 
media, public space and associations. Every citizen was enrolled into some kind of organization, 
from the "Front of Socialist Unity" for adults to the "Falcons of the Fatherland" for children aged 
3 to 7. All of these organizations were supposed to extend the mass basis of democracy, but in 
fact they just served as means to implement the official policies of the party. Whenever the party 
leadership took some important decision, it was "unanimously, enthusiastically approved" by these 
organizations. 
The only "civic" attitude that was allowed was to interfere with other people's lives and 
deeds. This was the specific communist empowerment of the individual. He was made to feel 
strong only if he was backed by some kind of official institution, like the party or police. Instead 
of defending citizens from the authorities or other forms of organized power, the "civic" attitude in 
this Romanian dystopia helped reproduce an atmosphere of fear. 
This kind of dystopic description depends, of course, on the embrace of its antithesis: the 
liberal democratic utopia which the socialist experiment claimed to supercede. In this sense, the 
construction of socialism relied on the critique of liberalism's eutopia, but the latter also provided 
the foundation for the utopian imagination that helped end communist rule across Eastern Europe. 
Although communist rule extended across Eastern Europe, the dystopia of Romanian real 
socialism was far more developed than in any other communist led society. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to say that in the popular consciousness of East Europeans, the various degrees of 
socialist dystopia are not seen as  much as  is the commonness of this dystopia across Eastern 
Europe. One can even see this in the construction of public opinion surveys administered by the 
University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research and their East European collaborators when 
10 It  was in this form that Nicolae Harsanyi explained how he perceived the dystopia of socialism 
to our common class on East European nationalism. 
they construct the image that East Europeans are all leaving the same dystopia behind, and 
moving toward the same eutopia of normality. But what is that normality? 
Is the eutopia of normality the import of the civil societies and market economies of 
Western Europe or North America? Or is it the normality of pre-communist Eastern Europe? In 
either case, the "normal" becomes rather utopian in a sense, because a remote way of life is first 
being imagined, and then called into being, in an entirely different society from that which existed 
between the wars or beyond the Iron Curtain. In the decades of communist rule, these societies 
became more industrialized and urbanized, but different from the West, a s  the tensions between 
East and West Germans in post-communist reconstruction illustrate. But whatever the experience 
of "normality" after the revolution, in 1989, the pourer of the socialist dystopia moved the people 
of communist-led societies to call for an eutopia of normality, which itself has many utopian 
elements. 
The "normal" in anti-communist discourse denies, after all, what exists in communist-led 
society or its aftermath as  desirable and rather -elevates to definitive features of normality certain 
elements that were ostensibly absent in socialist dystopia. The eutopic vision of normality is thus 
a transcendent vision based on the critique of the present. It is all the more powerful, however, 
because it denies its utopian dimensions, not entirely without justification. Nationalism, after all, 
is a very different kind of utopian vision than is the mislaid utopia associated with communist 
rule. 
11 This comment is based on Kennedy's participation in a conference sponsored by ISR in winter 
1992 in which he was asked to comment on a paper given by Elena Bashkirova, a Moscow-based 
public opinion researcher. She was reporting on the Times-Mirror survey on Russia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and other places, detailing the different responses to the appeal of the market, 
democracy and so on among these different post-communist countries. When Kennedy suggested 
that this was a misleading construction, that all are headed in the same direction of normality, 
leaving more or less the same place behind, Ronald Inglehart countered that one can always 
reduce social change to a more contextual level, and that this more abstract construction was a 
legitimate level of analysis. 
NATIONALISM 
One important characteristic generating the lability of the communist utopia is the 
irreducible gap between its ideal and reality. Because scientific socialism only claimed to know the 
process by which its promised utopia would be made, and that like a horizon, communism would 
never be reached, deviations from the promise of socialism's alternative could always be explained 
in terms of errant practices but never errant ideals. The ideal could remain pure because its 
implementation was always quite distant from it. Indeed, the powerful idealism and purity of the 
utopia has made many communists and socialists recant their left politics in the name of the ideals 
which once motivated their practices. In contrast, nationalists rarely recant. 
Nationalists rarely recant because of the different way in which the nationalist utopia 
relates to the practice of realizing it. Nationalism and communism differ in their scope. 
Communist utopias depend on transforming the whole of society in order to realize the elusive 
construct, while nationalist utopias depend on preserving that which external forces threaten to 
destroy. That preservation might require alterations in some domains,12 but changes are made 
principally in order save that which already exists, and that which is of the greatest value: the 
nation. 
In a way, nationalism then becomes the obvious foe to the communist experiment in 
Eastern Europe. Communism threatens with its universalism the particularity of the national 
potential based on its distinctive patrimony.13 Although communism might be invoked in struggle 
for national liberation against invaders, as  in Yugoslavia during World War 11, communism once 
in power also seems to generate nationalist opposition even when communism appears more or 
12 As Friederich List insisted that the relationship between the state and the economy be 
rearranged for all nations developing capitalism after England; see Roman Szporluk, Communism 
and Nationalism: Karl Marx vs Friederich List, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
13 For a particularly good essay comparing the apparent thinness and abstractness of 
communism as  a universal program, and the relative cultural depth of nationalism, see Kenneth 
Minogue and Beryl Williams, "Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union: The Revenge of Particularism" 
in Alexander Motyl (ed.) minking Theoreticallv about Soviet Natim&&s New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992. 
less home-grown, as  in Croatia in 1970-71 or even Serbia after Tito's death seem to suggest. 
Nationalism need not be deployed against communism, however. I t  might also be marshalled in 
communism's defense, as  it was in Fbmania by Ceausescu. 
Despite nationalism's multiple uses, nationalist utopias never claim the same universalism 
associated with socialism. Nationalist utopias are always exclusive in a sense; even the most 
"inclusive" and universal of nationalisms, that of the French or perhaps the Americans, demand 
conformity to commonly held visions of what it means to be French or American, even while they 
claim to allow anyone, regardless of bloodline, to become a member of the nation. Even the 
attempt to make Soviet patriotism an alternative to an ethnically national focus foundered on the 
rocks of what language this supranational expression would use to express its reverence. l4 
Not only, then, is nationalism less universalist than socialism, but it also is less 
ambivalent about the relationship of the individual to the collective in its utopia. Socialist utopia 
promised not only a certain kind of collective order based on greater equality and democracy, but 
also claimed to be creating the conditions for individual self-realization, transcending both the 
division of labor and local culture. Nationalism, by contrast, celebrates the individual only in so 
far as they are extensions of the nation. Indeed, most nationalist discourses incorporate 
outstanding individuals in their accounts, as heroes, martyrs and geniuses, but usually to 
epitomize the greatness of the collective body, and not the distinction of the individual. l5 
It  is more difficult, however, to homogenize nationalisms as  socialisms have been 
homogenized with communist rule. With nationalism's anti-universalist claims comes also 
apparent diversity, and not just with regard to content. Nationalism has many faces, as  each 
14 For a wonderful discussions of the diff~culties and alternatives involved in language policy of 
multinational states, see Paul R. Brass "Language and National Identity in the Soviet Union and 
India" in Alexander Motyl (ed.) think in^ Theoreticallv about Soviet Nationalities, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992. 
15 The individual epitomizing the nation, from the intellectual to the soldier, is usually male. 
Physicist Marie Curie Sklodowska for Poland and revolutionary heroine Ana Ipatescu in Fbmania 
are exceptions which prove the rule. Individual greatness that epitomizes the nation's essence is 
male; women are typically identified with the nation a s  its collective silent womb. 
nation claims their action based on national consciousness to be different from the consciousness of 
others. 
There are many labels used to distinguish among these nationalisms16, for instance the 
distinction between political and ethnic nationalism, or the distinction between liberal nationalism 
and integral nationalism, or the distinctions among official, revolutionary and diaspora 
nationalisms. One of the most interesting enterprises in the study of nationalism is to consider 
whether it is in fact a disservice to label all of these different forms variations on a common 
theme. Nevertheless, we establish that commonality in order to make nationalism's lability 
apparent. Categorizing them as essentially different from one another stabilizes the problem with 
a semantic gesture inappropriate to their transformations and mutations in practical activity. 
Nationalist utopias may be the most powerful transcendent visions in Eastern Europe, 
both historically and in the present. Because modern national consciousness was forged and 
cultivated in Eastern Europe a t  a time when imperial rather than nation states were the rule, 
nationalism acquired an emancipatory vision. The main dimension of oppression was identified to 
be the oppression of one nation by other nations, or of a nation by the supranational imperial state 
itself. 
16 Andrzej Walicki notes an important problem that constantly interferes in the dialogue between 
Anglo-Saxons and East Europeans. For the latter, nationalism is usually understood only in a 
narrow way, "it is a pejorative term, meaning, approximately, the same as chauvinism, narrow 
national egoism, state expansionism, intolerant attitudes toward national minorities and so forth" 
and was distinguished in the early nineteenth century from patriotism. In Anglo Saxon discourse, 
however, nationalism combines "every concern with winning national independence, awakening 
national consciousness or preserving national identity" Philosophy and Romantac 1 PWiona s . The . li m. 
Case of Poland, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. (p. 5). Walicki then writes "the contemporary 
English usage of the term 'nationalism' has many obvious advantages; it is perhaps preferable to 
have a common term for all the different -- both positive and negative -- manifestations of national 
feeling and national consciousness a t  different stages of their historical evolution" (pp. 5-6). We 
agree. What is more, the English use of the term also allows us to find the "bad" in the ostensibly 
"good," to discover even in ostensibly patriotic discourses the oppression of others as Ukrainians 
could find in Polish universalist claims, and the utopian in the apparently dystopian integral 
nationalisms, as  when otherwise decent people are moved to sacrifice themselves and their 
families for an exclusive organic vision of their nation. 
The period between the two world wars changed that, as  many nations, although not all, 
realized their own states. l7 With the nation's attainment of statehood, the nationalist utopia 
became dystopic, precisely because it was realized. 
The ideal of the nation seems lofty, but a t  the same time it is a t  one's fingertips. Unlike 
the communist utopia where the ideal is distant, the nationalist ideal is already present, embedded 
with the people of the nation and emboldened by its past. The nation needs tools and channels, 
however, to allow its full expression. The national poet or the nation state are typical vehicles 
through which the national ideal can be expressed. At the hands of the poet, however, the nation 
may retain its utopian quality, but a t  the hands of the state, it rarely can. Nevertheless, for most 
nationalist movements, poets are necessary but not sufficient. The state is a much more 
compelling way to assert the nation. 
Nation states of course express their nationalisms in different ways, being more and less 
tolerant of differences, or more and less insistant on conformity. But they all emphasize the 
primacy of national identity in the range of possible affiliations. l8 Certainly nationalism's dystopic 
quality is most obvious when it engages the "outsider," the ethnic, national or racial minority. 
In Poland and Hungary, post-communist nationalism seems comparatively innocent vis-a- 
vis its ethnic minorities because of the overwhelming perception that they are homogenous 
societies. But this perception is partly a consequence of communism itself. 
Communism helped to create the illusion of national homogeneity, expelling and forcing the 
assimilation or emigration of minorities. Those Germans who remained in Poland, for instance, 
were officially prohibited from establishing their own cultural associations and using German in 
schools. Anti-German propaganda and popular sentiment among Poles discouraged those with 
17 Ukraine, despite revolutionary struggles between 19 17 and 192 1, was denied fully 
independent status when most of its territory was incorporated into the Soviet Union a s  one of its 
socialist soviet republics, while a sizeable minority of Ukrainians lived within the Polish state. 
18 See Craig Calhoun, "Why Nationalism? Sovereignty, Self-Determination and Identity in a 
World System of States," American Journal of Sociolow (forthcoming). 
German ancestry from pushing their distinction. Even in an obviously more multinational state 
like Romania, homogenization moved ahead. 
After 1965, the Romanian official position was to create a homogeneous nation without 
any kind of ethnic distinctions in which all would speak the "language of work". Because of the 
increasing restrictions on the possibilities for minorities to express their distinction, this common 
language of work sounded more and more like Romanian. Hungarians and Serbs had to adapt and 
become acculturated; Germans and Jews could be sold to West Germany and lsrael.lg The status 
of Gypsies or the Roma Nation throughout Eastern Europe was the worst, and also the least 
understopd. 20 
In post-communist societies, however, the minorities tend to be elevated and even 
celebrated in the most official liberal public discourse, that of parliamentary representation. The 
Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania has about 7 per cent of the seats in the Romanian 
parliament, and each ethnic minority, including the Roma, has a t  least one representative. In 
Poland the new authorities actually encouraged Ukrainian and German minorities to enter 
parliament.21 outside parliaments, Jewish contributions to Polish culture are celebrated in 
 conference^.^^ The Ukrainian movement Rukh has a Jewish activist, Aleksandr Burakovsky, as 
chair of its Council of Nationalities, and in its literature, makes every attempt to construct a 
Ukrainian nationalism that celebrates its multinational condition. 
19 See Richard Wagner, "Ethnic Minorities in the National State: The Case of Germans in . . 
Romania," a paper presented a t  the conference, Utopian Revisions: Nationalism and Civil Societv 
in Eastern Euroae, Institute for the Humanities, the University of Michigan, October 29 and 30, 
1992. 
20 See Nicoale Gheorghe, "Roma-Gypsy Ethnicity," Social Research 58:4(1991):829-44. 
2 1 See Janusz Mucha, "Democratization and Cultural Minorities: The Polish Case of the 
1980's/1990s," East Euro~ean  Quarterly 25:4(1992):463-82. 
rother's K e e ~ e  22 For one example, see Antony Polonsky's (ed.) collection, Mv B r: Recent Polish 
Debates on the Holocaust, Routledge, 1990. In a more literary vein, the interest in Polish-Jewish 
writers like Bruno Szulc has increased considerably, yielding, among other things, a major 
conference on his work. Theodosia Robertson discussed this in her presentation to the University 
of Michigan's Center for Russian and East European Studies on October 21, 1992 entitled "New 
Perspectives on the Career of Bruno Szulc, 1882-1942". 
While diversity is celebrated among East European liberals, ethnic and national tensions 
proliferate among others, even in the liberally defined public sphere. Anti-semitic themes were 
prominent in the anti-Mazowiecki campaign in Poland's 1990 presidential electionsa3, in Istvan 
Csurka's critique of post-communist ~ u n ~ a r ~ ~ ~  and in the attacks on Petre Roman, the former 
Romanian prime minister. 
More physical expressions of this intolerance are also present. The most dramatic 
examples occur in the anti-Romany violence in Hungary, Poland, Romania and elsewhere 
throughout Eastern Europe. But threats are also felt among those better represented and more 
celebrated in the new post-communist parliaments. The German-Polish deputy, Henryk Kroll, 
lamented the worsening relations among Poles and Germans in Opole, for instance,25 and the 
desecration of Jewish cemeteries and monuments procedes without sufficient discouragement by 
the new authorities. But if the dystopia of nationalism is most apparent in war, then the status of 
Hungarians in contemporary Romania deserves elaboration. 
The revolution against Ceausescu and his regime began on December 16, 1989 in the 
streets of Timisoara when Romanians, Hungarians and others joined to protect the Hungarian 
minister Laszlo Tokes from being evicted from his home by the Securitate. From its inception, the 
revolution promised the supercession of nationalist intolerance, for it seemed finally clear that 
good relationships among majority Romanians and minorities were in everybody's interests. 
Ceausescu's last attempt to accuse foreigners and minorities of threatening the country's 
sovereignty didn't work out. And the first official declarations of the post-communist political 
23 See Konstanty Gebert, "Anti-Semitism in the 1990 Polish Presidential Election," Social 
Research 58:4(1991):723-55. 
24 In a study released in August 1992, the vice president of Hungary's ruling party, the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum, argued that Hungary's politics were being controlled by 
international forces dominated by Jews. Under pressure from a t  home and abroad, he revised his 
generalizing anti-semitic indictment to refer only to the Jewishness of former communist leaders 
in Hungary's history, from Bela Kun to Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gero. 
25 Reported in FBIS Report on Eastern Europe, September 23, 1992, p. 21. 
establishment in the National Salvation Front reinforced this hopeful image. But old habits die 
hard. 
All high and almost all low level officials, party activists, Securitate and army officers 
were Romanians. Therefore, as  soon as they realized that their wheel of fortune was turning 
downwards, they also realized that their only way to avoid losing face, and, possibly, to remain in 
power, was to break up the freshly forged solidarity into various warring factions. What these 
people aimed at, in the first place, was to be looked upon not as  individuals who had (or not) 
collaborated with the previous hateful regime, but to be seen a s  part of the Romanian people, 
endlessly threatened or despised by malevolent and ruthless "others". These former officials were 
joined by many mediocre, but ambitious, individuals who in order to push themselves forward, had 
no other asset to promote but their pure "Romanianness". Instead of the tools of communist 
, -. oppression, the Securitate and other collaborators are today portrayed by nationalists as  heroes 
- who helped preserve the nation. 
.-. So, the old and well known nationalist discourse was reactivated soon in January 1990, 
whose declared concern was (and still is) to defend the Romanian majority against the minorities. 
Of course the arch-enemy was identified with the Hungarians, both those living in Romania (about 
2 million) and those living in Hungary or elsewhere in the world. Within two months, the rhetoric 
escalated into violent clashes between Hungarians and Romanians. The Hungarians' claims for 
more rights were then perceived as a threat to the Romanian nation and its integrity. Although 
the violence has not itself grown, the discourse on the Hungarian threat to the Romanian nation 
has become more effective in actual political mobilization. In the elections of September 1992, for 
example, explicitly right wing nationalist parties, like The Party of National Unity of Romanians 
(the political expression of Vatm Romanesca or Romanian Hearth) and the Greater Romania 
Party, took fifteen per cent of the seats in parliament. 
The threat to Hungarians by Romanian nationalism was one of the most important 
political issues in communist led Hungary, uniting opposition and authorities in a common concern. 
The Hungarian Democratic Forum, now the ruling party, made the plight of Hungarians abroad 
one of its central themes in opposition to communism and liberalism. Now that it is the ruling 
party in the Hungarian post-communist state, Romanian nationalists have found even more fertile 
ground for imagining the Hungarian threat to Romania's territorial integrity. Conflicts within 
Romania therefore contain these seeds of international conflict.26 
The dystopia of nationalism is thus better developed in contemporary Romania than in any 
of our other cases. This is probably because nationalism was linked to communism under 
Ceausescu, being the distinguishing feature of the Romanian brand of communism. 
All states rely on symbols to mobilize support. After World War 11, East European states 
acquired a new set of symbols as they became communist states. They all became People's 
Republics, from the Polish to the Hungarian to the Romanian People's Republic. The Ukrainians 
were now incorporated in one political unit, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Old symbols 
were destroyed; the crown was taken off the Polish eagle, and the Romanian eagle disappeared 
altogether. Until 1956 in Hungary, the communist red star replaced the traditional coat of arms 
on Hungary's flag. 
Symbols have emotive power, but these symbols of communism mainly generated negative 
feelings, given that they stood for national subordination to Soviet rule. Across Eastern Europe, 
national roads to communism later were evoked in order to legitimate home communist rule, but 
nowhere more forcefully than in Romania under Ceausescu. 
National symbols were elevated in their use in Romania. Romania was recentered in the 
official name of the country. I t  was no longer only an adjective, but the biggest noun. The 
Socialist Republic of ROMANIA was inscribed on the emblem in the center of the national flag. 
The national anthem, which after communism's introduction celebrated the signalling of 
26 Ioan Mircea Pascu, the counsellor for foreign affairs, office of the Romanian presidency, sees 
Romania as  threatened by all its neighbors. He writes in "Romania's Response to a Restructured 
World," that "... on our western border, a bloc of Catholic states is taking place under the 
guidance of Budapest and Vienna backed by Berlin. The "Slav Bloc," consisting of orthodox 
Russia and the Ukraine, will dominate our northern and eastern borders, while Islamic Turkey -- 
with which Romania maintains extensive and good relations and has concluded a treaty -- is 
becoming more and more active close to our southern border" in Daniel N. Nelson (ed.), Romania 
After Tvrannv, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, p. 279. 
communism's dawn by the battleship Aurora, was replaced. A nineteenth century nationalist 
hymn, the Three Colors, was legislated as the new anthem: the tune was the original composed by 
Ciprian Porumbescu 130 years earlier, but the verses were new, adapted to the new socialist 
realities.27 Little by little, every policy, from industrialization and the prohibition on abortion to 
the razing of villages and the direction of cultural production, was cast in terms of the struggle of 
the Romanian nation to assert its independence, sovereignty and ultimately its greatness. 
The greatness of the Romanian nation and its leader was even reinforced by Western 
practice, when it applauded Ceausescu's condemnation of the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. But even here, the protest was justified to the Romanian people in terms 
of violations of the integrity of a nation state, not in terms of the violation of basic human rights. 
From that time on, the West looked upon Ceausescu a s  their favorite maverick communist, who 
had the courage to stand up against the Soviet Union. And that also won him favor a t  home. 
Given his identification with the national ideal of independence and sovereignty over and 
above communist internationalism, many intellectuals joined the Communist Party. The power of 
Romanian nationalism made even communism appear patriotic. In this way, the nationalistic 
discourse of the interwar period was revived by the Party apparatus.28 The celebration of the 
national idea went so far as  to acquire rather grotesque dimensions. For instance, every cultural 
event, even a symposium on post-structuralist literary theory, had to be organized and 
incorporated within the all-inclusive Festival, "Song to Romania," and then, the symposium could 
take place only if some papers on the Romanian contributions to French literary theory were also 
presented. 
When communism and nationalism are linked so organically, then, the chances for post- 
communist nationalism are greater. In Ukraine, however, the struggle of both communists and 
27 The new national anthem of Romania after 1989 has become yet another national hymn by the 
same composer of the Three Colors, called "Romanians Awake!" 
28 For an outstanding analysis of cultural production and the revival of nationalist discourse, see . . . .  . 
Katherine Verdery, M i o n a l  Ideolow under S o c i a h s m : n a n d C u r a l  Politics in 
cu's Romania. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 
their anti-communist opponents for a national culture and for state sovereignty has generated a 
fundamentally different kind of nationalism, one where its utopian elements might still be found. 
Ukrainian nationalism is different from that in Poland, Hungary and Romania. First, the 
glory of its national past is a little more difficult to recall than in our other cases29, and the nation 
is less certain about its own distinctions from its neighbor than are the other cases in our 
comparison. The passion to "Ukrainianize" higher education and to circulate a different national 
currency from the Russian ruble are signs of the need to construct the national distinction, rather 
than just release it from communist oppression.30 
The main vehicle for realizing this longstanding utopia of course is the independent state. 
It  is so important that even longstanding dissident opponents to communism like Ivan Drach are 
willing to collaborate with the former chief of ideology for the communist party, Leonid Krawchuk, 
in defense of the state. Here, nationalism elevates above all other principles the vehicle of its 
expression because it needs to realize and not just release the nation. In this, perhaps, Ukraine's 
nationalist utopia is more like the communist utopia than any of the other nationalisms in our 
purview, because the national ideal cannot be based so easily in the past or present, but relies 
more on the dreams of those who administer the state. 
This nationalism seems to have retained its utopian quality more than other nationalisms 
also because it is not based only on the defense of that which is essentially Ukrainian, but also 
because it is actively engaged in discovering what is Ukrainian. One part of that search is a 
Westward gaze toward the ideology of civil society and its embrace of individualism in a pluralist 
29 For instance, consider the importance of the Cossacks in defining a common national heritage; 
see Frank Sysyn, "The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology," Social 
Research 58:4(1991):845-64, or the emphasis given to Ukraine's link to tenth century Kievan 
Rus'; see Mykola Ryabchuk, "Civil Society.and National Emancipation: The Ukrainian Case" in 
Zbigniew Rau (ed.), The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
Westview Press, 1991. 
30 For a rather critical essay on the new Ukrainian nationalism, see Abraham Brumberg, "Not So 
Free At Last," New York Review of Books October 22, 1992. 
state. But even the marriage of civil society with nationalism does not ensure that nationalism 
will begin a descent to dystopia. Poland is a good example of that. 
I t  is common in Eastern Europe to see liberalism and nationalism as opposing visions. 
One can look for variations on this theme with Romanian nationalist criticisms of their early 
liberals, Russian criticisms of those who would Westernize their lands, and the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum's criticisms of the liberalism of the Association of Free Democrats and FiDeSz. 
But in Poland, it was those with a liberal vision who best wore the cloak of national devotion, 
thanks to Solidarity. 
The obvious efforts undertaken and sufferings endured by liberal Polish intellectuals. like 
Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik or Bronislaw Geremek on behalf of Solidarity and the nation made 
them part of the obvious political class to replace the communists in 1989. But also, the origins of 
Polish nationalism in the nineteenth century gave Poland a fundamentally different kind of 
cultural legacy on which to draw, and which made certain principles of liberalism and nationalism 
more compatible. 
Andrzej walicki3 identified several alternative nationalisms within the Polish experience, 
but the one we wish to emphasize here is the nationalism based on the nation as  an ethical ideal. 
Because Polish nationalism was first developed in the romantic era, when Mickiewicz and Mazzini 
could struggle on behalf of each other's nations in the name of a higher principle of cultural 
pluralism, Polish nationalism from the start  had an "all-European" quality to it. The ideal of the 
nation could not be based on what was exclusive to it, but what was universal in it, and has yet to 
be realized. Walicki quotes Poland's national poet, Adam Mickiewicz: "The Fatherland of the 
Poles is not a mere piece of land bound by frontiers which limit the national existence and activity 
of the Pole," and Walicki then goes on to say, describing this view, that "the Fatherland of the 
31 "The Three Traditions of Polish Patriotism and Their Contemporary Relevance," a paper read 
a t  Indiana University, Bloornington, Indiana, March 26, 1987. Available from the Polish Studies 
Center, Indiana University, 1988. 
Poles is an ideal which has never existed, since the actual Poland never fulfilled all the conditions 
necessary for its realization" (p. 16). 
All East European nationalisms had their origins in Romantic thought and ideas about the 
brotherhood of nations, but nowhere else has this romantic spirit survived the rise of integral 
nationalism better than in Poland. Because of its survival, Polish nationalism could more easily be 
associated with the liberalism of civil society, in as much as this liberalism was now seen as the 
all-European ideology of universalism. But liberalism and civil society as  utopia do not guarantee 
the survival of these lofty national images. 
LIBERALISM AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
Civil society and the liberal vision associated with it gained part of its power in Eastern 
Europe because of its claim to be eutopic, not utopian. After all, those with a westward gaze 
would claim, those societies which have not only economic prosperity but political freedoms are 
those which are constructed along liberal principles, where freedoms of association, press, speech, 
and economic association rest. 
Polish Solidarity was the first and most powerful expression of this vision of civil society, 
but it was a civil society not exactly like that found in the West. I t  was not based on private 
property but on the decentralization of the economy through self management; it was not based on 
the pluralism of competing political parties, but on the opening of a public sphere in which a self 
organized society would influence the ruling political party; it was not based on a state whose laws 
are legitimate, but on a mobilized society which pressured the state to follow the rule of law. This 
vision of civil society, however, did not survive the imposition of martial law on December 13, 
1981. The rapidity of change in 1989 further destroyed the possibility for gradual change based 
on pragmatic domestic visions, and rather was replaced by an embrace of a more totalistic vision 
of Western l i b e r a ~ i s m . ~ ~  
32 See Michael D. Kennedy, "The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies and Post- 
Communist Regimes in Hungary and Poland," Theorv and Society 21(1992):29-76. 
The utopian quality of privatizing all of state industry is being increasingly recognized as 
such by Polish government officials,33 but that is not our focus. Rather, it is the contradictions 
and expectations of the open public sphere itself. 
The utopian dimension of civil society and its public sphere rests in the expectation that 
the predominant form of social movement and public discourse will be democratic, tolerant and 
inclusive. Civil societies were revered in Eastern Europe and the West in the struggle against 
communism because they typically embraced the language of human rights and pluralism in their 
opposition to the system. But once the activists of civil societies gain access to state power, there 
is no guarantee that they will remain so open and tolerant as  they were in opposition. And there 
is also no guarantee that the very openness of the public sphere will mean the defeat of those who 
use that public sphere to limit democracy's scope or the rights of its demos. There are reasons to 
think that liberalism is unlikely to survive the end to communism!34 
The utopian quality of civil society and liberalism is most apparent in Romania, where the 
survival of the most extreme communism and its mentality was ensured by the restoration of 
nationalism as the centerpiece of post-communist legitimacy. Both society and the state embraced 
the totalizing vision of a centrally controlled system. In this context, liberalism is viewed as an 
anti-national, anti-patriotic doctrine. Mobilizing against liberalism generates support for the 
nationalist neo-communist alliance which rules Romania; they needed only reactivate the 
discourse of communist times to defeat the liberalism the Timisoara rebellion promised. 
33 Maciej Drozdowski, economics consul a t  the Polish Consulate in Chicago, now says that it is 
wrong to focus on privatization as  a goal, and rather, what is the "optimal" level of privatization 
given Polish conditions. "Will Privatization Succeed in Poland?" a t  the conference "From Post- 
Communism to Post-Solidarity: Polish Transition Embroiled," November 20, 1992 a t  St. Mary's 
College, Orchard Lake, Michigan. 
34 Andrew Arato has written a very good paper showing the difficulties facing Hungary in its 
institutionalization of civil society, and why the concept remains a good normative vision in the 
post-communist epoch. See "Revolution, Restoration and Legitimation: Ideological Problems of the 
Transition from State Socialism," a paper delivered a t  the conference, Utopian Revisions; . . 
Nationalim and Civil Societv in Eastern Euro~e ,  Institute for the Humanities, the University of 
Michigan, October 29 and 30, 1992. 
At the same time, some of the principles of liberalism, like pluralism and freedom of 
speech, enable the cooptation of some liberals who were ready to compromise with the survivors of 
the old communist e ~ t a b l i s h m e n t . ~ ~  The new authorities construct the impression of presiding 
over a pluralistic society, while those coopted get the impression that they are helping to make it. 
But as  the wave of nationalist rhetoric intensifies, even the pretense of liberalism will be sacrificed 
in the name of the nation. 
Liberalism's eutopic dimension is more apparent in Poland. Solidarity helped to generate 
not only a political class with liberal views, but also a wider Polish culture that was more tolerant 
and insistent on democracy. At the same time, however, liberalism's hegemony concealed 
fundamental differences in morality, which, in an open public sphere, come to the fore. 
The controversy over rights to abortion illustrates this tension. Public opinion polls clearly 
favor retaining abortion rights, but the Catholic Church, the Physicians' Chamber and other well 
organized groups have pushed the issue beyond return. This, they say, is not a matter of choice, 
personal conscience' or even democracy; it is a matter of what is right. Liberals find themselves 
trapped. 
In order to push forward with economic reforms, they must include in their government 
activists from Christian parties whose first priority is the restoration of morality to a Polish 
society corrupted by communism's atheism, and who view liberal emphases on the separation of 
church and state as  something inappropriate for a Catholic nation like Poland. Thus, while 
Poland's ethnic minorities are not so endangered as  Itomania's, the very definition of Polishness is 
being narrowed and more tightly circumscribed so that even Poles might find their rights 
endangered by a nationalism based on a religious crusade. 
35 One of the most vexing dimensions facing liberal thought is that of lustration and other forms 
of using past behavior to indicate present rights. Liberal documents like the Timisoara 
Proclamation of March 11, 1990 proposed that a new electoral law be introduced prohibiting 
former Communist activists and Securitate officers from being president and from running for 
political office. See "The Timisoara Proclamation" in Th e E ast Euro~ean  Re~or t e r  4:2(1990): 32- 
35. For a contrasting liberal view on this subject, see the paper by Arab  cited above. 
Not every post-communist nation has so powerful a church as  Poland, but every post- 
communist nation has a large industrial working class whose acceptance of liberal economic policy 
to this date-is almost a miracle, if God is on the side of private property. And if God is so allied, 
the dystopic power of really existing socialism deserves beatification. 
If really existing socialism did not generate its own legitimacy, it did make a class which, 
after the fall of communist party rule, has a neo-socialist interest.36 Workers' resistance to 
closing the large inefficient plants which employed many of them is only to be expected, and that 
it has taken so long to occur and spread can be attributed to the power of the socialist dystopia on 
which the liberal economic utopia rests. But the power of this old dystopia is being displaced as  
the policies of the liberal economic utopia are put in place. 
Even the former allies of the liberal intellectuals, the Solidarity trade union, has been 
forced to take a far more militant stance against the shock therapy that was supposed to be the 
quicker road to eutopia. They were forced to do this because they had competition, from those 
who claim, in Solidarity '80, to more truly represent the interest of the old union which brought 
down communism, and also competition from the old communist trade union, which now claims 
genuine support from workers. The utopian side of socialism thus returns as  its dystopic memory 
is being revised in light of the new liberal economic dystopia. But by leaving nationalism out of 
socialism, we only see part of the picture. 
More than in any other place in our four countries, in Poland, nationalism was constructed 
against actually existing socialism. As such, the spectacle of former Solidarity activists and 
former Communist activists working together to oppose a truly Polish government's efforts to 
privatize has sparked yet another transformation of the relationship between socialism and 
nationalism. To represent workers, a new union has been formed: its symbol carries the most 
powerful expression of the nation's struggle against communism. The new union is named for 
36 Edmund Mokrzycki, "The Vicious Circles of Utopias in Eastern Europe," a paper delivered a t  . . . . 
the conference, U t o m  Revlsi~gs: N a t W i s m  and Civil Society in Eastern E u r o s  Institute for 
the Humanities, the University of Michigan, October 29 and 30, 1992. 
Father Jerzy Popieluszko, the priest-activist known for his rousing sermons on the Polish 
fatherland, and who was murdered by communist secret police in 1984. Thus, nationalism doesn't 
just affect the debate over the consistancy of state policy with Catholic morality, but it even 
extends to what the proper representation of workers in a truly Polish civil society should be. 
The difficulties involved in the construction of a post-communist society are likely to push 
people to find the answers to economic, political and social problems in recasting and legislating 
morality and its accompanying identities. Strict definitions of what it means to be Polish, or at  
least a "true Pole" should not be seen as  deviations from the logic of the post-communist 
transformation, even if they are departures from the utopian tolerance and pluralism of a civil 
society. Thus, even in Poland, where civil society is no longer the dream of utopian thinkers, the 
idea of a civil society nonetheless retains many utopian qualities. 
CONCLUSION 
We can make no forecasts about the future of Eastern Europe or even of any of the 
individual countries upon which we have focused. After all, post-communism has completed only 
its third year of existance. Despite the glorious proclamations from the East received with the 
enthusiastic applause of the West, many things are still in a raw state, defined by the lability of 
their experiment in which new directions are confronted with old mentalities and practices which 
themselves generate new conditions that are less and less a s  the utopians imagined. Labilities 
within and across visions generate unforeseeable possibilities and frustrations. 
In Romania, communist and nationalist utopias were merged after 1965, whereas in 
Poland, communist and nationalist visions were locked in bitter opposition. In Hungary, liberalism 
managed to move Hungarian nationalism away from obsessions with past glories and regional 
aspirations towards a spirit of compromise in ending communism. Liberalism also infused the 
Polish and Ukrainian movements for ending communism, but Polish nationalism finds the 
compromise with communists anathema to the national ideal, while Ukrainian nationalists are 
supporting the former Party leader in his efforts to extend his presidential executive powers in 
order to assure the state which might build the nation. In Romania, the nation is not being built 
with anything new, whereas the Ukrainians try to integrate liberalism in their national self 
definition. Rather, a fundamentalist Romanian nationalism is being used to consolidate the power 
and privilege of communists who claim their former politics a s  an expression of their devotion to 
the sovereign, but ever threatened, Romanian nation.37 
In sum, our two tripartite relations - among utopia, dystopia and eutopia and among 
liberalism, nationalism and communism - suggest why we elevate lability to the center of our 
analytical project. While analysts of utopia or dystopia, or of nationalism or communism or 
liberalism, manage their project by studying in isolation one or another of these visions, it is only 
in their relationship to one another that these visions of alternatives come to life. While they 
claim to exist in opposition to one another, they are also dependent on one another for their 
construction. And it is in their dependence that they acquire their instability. Their mutuality 
and their omissions open the window for others, who, with their pens or their politics, may force 
yet another set of meanings onto old visions, especially in Eastern Europe. 
37 For a discussion of this and other kinds of nationalism in the post-communist world, see 
Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Fantasies of Salvation: Varieties of Nationalism in Post-Communist . . . . 
Eastern Europe," a paper delivered a t  the conference, Utopian Revisuns: N a t i d s m  and C~vil 
Societv in Eastern Europe, Institute for the Humanities, the University of Michigan, October 29 
and 30, 1992. 
